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Creating a Category Under the Kyoto Protocol Based on Non 
Emissions  
Erin Sedloff1 
I. INTRODUCTION
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A. The Incorporation of Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation Projects into
the Clean Development Mechanism
B. Market-Based Preservation Projects Have not Been
Incorporated
III. INCORPORATING MARKET-BASED PRESERVATION PROGRAMS
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A. The Time is Right, the World is Ready
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D. Avoiding Deforesation Initiatives Such as the Yasuni
Represent a Bold Assertation of Environmental Justice
VI. NEXT STEPS: MAKING AVOIDED DEFORESTATION PROJECTS
FEASIBLE BY ALLOWING THEM TO BE INCOMRPORATED INTO
INTERNATIONAL CARBON MARKETS
A. Credits for the Nonexploitation of Fossil Fuels
VII. CONCLUSION
“What about making the Yasuní Park a sanctuary for humanity
and nature? It would be extraordinary . . . We should be an
intelligent country. Oil is unsustainable.  We must see it in the
long term.”2
-Alberto Acosta, Former Oil Minister of Quito
I. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, which binds thirty-seven nations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels 
between 2008-2012, is set to expire in 2012.3  Prior to its expiration, a new 
protocol must be negotiated and important questions regarding what 
carbon caps should be instituted, what market mechanisms should be 
available for meeting those caps, and a timeline for meeting those goals, 
must be resolved.4   
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations’ 
scientific advisors, suggest that developed nations must cut their emissions 
“between 25% and 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, and between 50% and 85% 
by 2050” in order to “head off the worst effects of climate change.”5  Many 
believe, however, that such commitments are economically and practically 
infeasible.6  Therefore, in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, it is 
imperative that flexibility mechanisms are expanded to afford developed 
nations the opportunity to work toward achieving these goals.  Such 
“flexibility mechanisms” allow countries that are unable to meet their carbon 
caps to offset their usage using a market solution that falls into one of three 
discreet categories as defined by the Kyoto Protocol: Clean Development 
2. Vidal, John, Andean Voices: Alberto Acosta, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/dec/02/andean-voices-alberto-acosta (Dec. 2, 2010). 
3. Kyoto Protocol (1998), available at http://unfccc.nt/kyoto_protocol/
items/2830.php. 
4. Kyoto Protocol’s Successor: too much, too soon? (June 4, 2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and Emissions Trading Mechanism.7  The 
new market solution I am proposing would fall within the Clean 
Development Mechanism as defined by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.8   
Deforestation is responsible for an estimated 20 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.9   
Avoided deforestation projects, such as the Yasuni Initiative, which 
achieve concomitant benefits of avoided extraction, avoided fuel-
combustion, and avoided colonization (hereafter referred to as “Market-
based Preservation Projects”), represent a holistic approach to climate 
change by controlling not just the release, but also the sequestration of 
carbon from the atmosphere.  Among the leading causes of deforestation 
are clearing forestland for agriculture, mineral extraction, hydro-reservoirs, 
and degradation of forests for fuel wood.10  While deforestation alone results 
in the destruction of a carbon sink, the accompanying activity is an 
additional source of excessive greenhouse gas emissions.  The benefits of 
avoiding deforestation stretch far beyond the preservation of the forest 
whether it is clearing for the purpose of rearing methane-producing cattle or 
extracting fossil fuels. 
In a revolutionary avoided deforestation initiative, Ecuador is proposing to 
leave fossil fuel-rich regions untouched in exchange for the value of the oil 
under the surface.  The project will result in the preservation of the forest as 
a carbon sink and prevent the colonization of the surrounding area, 
extraction of the fossil fuels, and operation of greenhouse gas emitting 
industrial machinery.  Since Ecuador is asking only to be compensated for 
the value of the oil, the additional environmental benefits that result from 
the non-extraction of the oil are surplus benefits.  Incorporating carbon 
credits earned via such market-based preservation projects into the next 
international binding agreement on climate change is essential.  The current 
negotiation process is perhaps the last opportunity to create an economic 
incentive for preserving hubs of biodiversity.  Although issues of valuation 
and verification of such projects will continue to be grappled with, reliable 
7. Id.
8. “The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties 
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3.” Kyoto Protocol (1998), Article 12, available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.   
9. Myers, Erin C. (Dec. 2007). “Policies to Reduce Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Tropical Forests” (PDF), Resources Magazine: 
7 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
10. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technologies, Policies and
Measures for Mitigating Climate Change, Technical Paper 1 (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/paper-I-en.pdf. 
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systems of administration of such programs already exist and should be 
used as models.11   
In this note, I assert that market-based preservation programs should 
be incorporated into the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  First, I outline the 
current state of international climate change treaties.  Next, I list the 
reasons that market-based preservation projects must be incorporated into 
the successor by outlining the value of such projects.  Finally, I look at the 
Yasuní Initiative as a model for market-based preservation programs, and 
will discuss the structure of the program as a guide to be integrated into the 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 
II. The State of International Climate Change Negotiations
In 2007, following the United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Bali, all participating nations agreed to adopt the “Bali road map,” which 
committed participating nations to negotiating a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol over the next two years.  In 2009 at the Conference of the Parties in 
Copenhagen, no formal successor was adopted, but the Copenhagen Accord 
(“Accord”) was “taken note of.”12  Although no formal binding commitments 
for the successor to the Kyoto Protocol have been recorded, the path has 
been paved for a few key components to be incorporated, including a global 
market to cap and trade carbon dioxide emissions,13 a recognition that a 
scientific basis exists for keeping temperature rises below 2°C, a 
commitment to increasing contributions for climate related projects to the 
developing world, and support for REDD+ mechanisms for reducing CO2 
emissions.14 
11. Pax Natura, NEWS: Costa Rica – A Leader in Forest Preservation,http:// available at
www.trunity.net/paxnatura/news/view/131452/?topic=8718 (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
12. “UNFCC: Text of Copenhagen Accord” http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011); See also Werksman, Jacob, 
Taking Note of the Copenhagen Accord: What it Means (December 2009), available at 
http://www.wri.org/stories/2009/12/taking-note-copenhagen-accord-what-it-means. 
One political scholar explains “the words ‘legally binding’ were conspicuously 
removed from earlier drafts of the Accord by delegations that aren’t yet ready to 
enter into a legally binding instrument. But the Accord is ‘politically binding’ on 
those countries that choose to sign up to it.” 
13. See “Guardian Unlimited: Global leaders reach climate change agreement.”
The Guardian London (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2007/feb/16/usnews.greenpolitics. Known as the Washington 
Declaration,” the G8 plus five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) met in 
Washington and informally agreed that a global cap and trade market for CO
2
 
emissions should be incorporated into a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.   
14. Id.
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A. The Incorporation of Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation Projects into the
Clean Development Mechanism15
In the agreement that emerged from the meeting of global leaders in 
Cancun in 2010, the Conference of Parties adopted a document titled, 
“Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action Under the Convention,” which included an outline 
agreement on the REDD program.16  Under this agreement, aforestation and 
reforestation projects are eligible to earn tradable credits under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (“CDM”) of the Kyoto Protocol.17  Aforestation 
refers to anthropogenic conversion of nonforested areas that have not been 
forested for at least fifty years into forested land.18  Reforestation refers to 
conversion of non-forested areas that have not been forested since 
December 31, 1989.19   
From its inclusion in the Bali Action Plan in 2007 at Conference of the 
Parties (“COP”) 13, through negotiations in Poznan in 2008,20 to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCC”) Talks in Bonn 
in 2009,21 REDD has transformed into an enhanced, broad-based approach 
to mitigate the effects of climate change.  REDD focuses not only on 
conservation, but on sustainable forest management and forest carbon stock 
enhancement, thereby earning the title “REDD+.”22  The agreement that 
15. Abate, Randall, REDD, White and Blue: Is Proposed U.S. Climate Legislation
Adequate to Promote a Global Carbon Credit System for Avoided Deforestation in a Post-Kyoto 
Regime?, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95 (Winter 2010).  
16. Draft decision -/CP.16 (Advance Unedited Version), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf 
17. See Bernard Schlamadinger et al., Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation
in the International Response to Climate Change?, Tropical Deforestation and Climate 
Change 53, 53 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005). 
18. CDM Rulebook, Clean Development Mechanism Rules, Practice and
Procedures, available at http://www.cdmrulebook.org/287. 
19. See Rômulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The
Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism Ten 
Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 643 (2008). See also 6/CMP.1, 
Annex, paragraph 1(c), CDM Rulebook, Clean Development Mechanism Rules, 
Practice and Procedures, available at http://www.cdmrulebook.org/ 363. 
20. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Pozan Climate
Change Conference (Dec. 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_14/items/ 
4481.php. 
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn Climate
Change Conference (June 2009), http://unfccc.int/meetings/sb30/items/4842.php. 
22. Charlie Parker et al., Global Canopy Programme, The Little REDD+ Book 14
(2009), available at http://www.globalcanopy.org/themedia/file/PDFs/LRB_lowres/lrb_ 
en.pdf.  For a detailed discussion of REDD+ and its possible role as a component of 
a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, see infra Part III.B. 
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emerged from Cancun did not explicitly state where financing for REDD 
projects will come from, but requested that governments explore options for 
financing prior to the next international climate change meeting in Durban. 
Many believe that this omission implies that financing will be generated via 
the carbon market, which would allow developed nations to purchase 
reforestation credits to offset their own surplus emissions.23  
Most recently, at the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties 
(“COP 17”) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCC”), in 2011 in Durban, South Africa, delegates again did not agree on 
a plan to finance REDD projects and officially postponed making such a 
decision until COP 18.  However, negotiators did conclude that “results-
based finance provided to developing country parties that is new, additional 
and predictable may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private 
bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.”24  
B. Market-Based Preservation Projects Have Not Been
Incorporated
The Yasuní Initiative, as proposed by the government of Ecuador, 
affords developed nations the opportunity to invest in the preservation of 
forested land by compensating them for the revenue that they would have 
gained from the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels.  By providing an 
economic incentive to developing nations such as Ecuador who, otherwise 
could not afford to forgo profits from extraction, the preservation of 
biologically and culturally diverse regions becomes a possibility.  By 
compensating developing nations for abstaining from exploiting their 
resource-rich land, projects like Yasuni offer a realistic solution to mitigate 
the effects of climate change, by “creat[ing] a financial value for the carbon 
stored in forests,” and offer “incentives for developing countries to reduce 
emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable 
development.”25  
23. Lang, Chris, Four Reactions to Cancun: Via Campesina, Bolivia, Friends of the Earth
International and Indigenous Environmental Network, available at http://www.redd-
monitor.org/ 2010/12/12/four-reactions-to-cancun-via-campesina-bolivia-friends-of-
the-earth-international-and-indigenous-environmental-network/ (Dec. 12, 2010). 
24. Draft Decision, CP.17, paragraph 65, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_safeguards.pdf. 
25. See About REDD+, UN-REDD Programme, available at http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 
2010). 
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III. Incorporating Market-Based Preservation Programs into
a Successor to the Kyoto Protocol
According to the United Nations REDD program, deforestation and 
forest degradation are greater contributors to pollution than all of the 
world’s cars, trains, planes and ships combined.26  Scientists estimate that in 
the next five years alone, deforestation will release more CO2 than all aircraft 
from the time the Wright Brothers first flew their airplanes until 2025.27  
Among the benefits of forest retention are the preservation of bio-diverse 
hotspots, preservation of indigenous cultures, the avoided release of carbon 
from exploitation of mined materials such as fossil fuels, avoided GHG 
emissions from avoided colonization, and the sequestration of existing 
carbon.28   
If the “natural value” of a live tree is unaccounted for, then there is no 
question that the tree is worth more as lumber or paper.29  However, new 
market mechanisms and incentives are beginning to recognize and reward 
protection of the natural environment by considering the value of 
environmental externalities and are focusing on both the impacts and 
results of conservation.30  By considering market-based preservation 
programs, we begin to reshape a valuation scheme that recognizes the 
actual market value of developing nations’ commitment to preserve 
biologically diverse regions.  Experts have begun this process by accounting 
for “functional acres,”31 which include tons of carbon avoided, in addition to 
the value of the untouched land itself, or “ecosystem productivity.”32 
A. The Time is Right, The World is Ready
Following the negotiations in Cancun, it was clear that many of the 
26. Rhett Butler, Forest Conservation in U.S. Climate Policy: An Interview with
Jeff Horowitz, Mongabay.com (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://print.news. 
mongabay.com/2010/0205-adp_forests_redd.html?print (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
27. Mitchell, Andrew, Forests First in the Fight Against Climate Change, The Vivo
Carbon Initiative (June 2007). 
28. See Carbon Conservation, available at http://www.carbonconservation.com/
media.html.  Since trees soak up carbon dioxide through photosynthesis, the 
preservation of forests actually results in a sequestration of CO
2
 emissions. 
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. To see how these functional acres are applied in practice, see, e.g.,
Willamette Partnership, Ecosystem Credit Accounting-Pilot General Crediting 
Protocol: Willamette Basin Version 1.1, at 6 (2009), available at http:// 
willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/willamette-ecosystem-
marketplace-documents/General%20Crediting%CC20Protocol%207.20.09.pdf. 
32. Id.
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fundamental decisions regarding what would be incorporated into a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol would not be decided until the meeting in 
Durban, South Africa in 2011.  Among the few firm commitments made in 
the agreement in Cancun, the Conference of parties agreed to establish a 
Green Climate Fund, comprised of delegates from both the developing and 
developed world, which would be responsible for supporting “projects, 
programmes, policies and other activities” in developing countries.33  
Developed nations agreed to raise U.S.$100 billion annually for the fund to 
be disbursed to developing countries.  The creation of this fund shows that 
the developed world is ready, willing and able to invest significant resources 
in sound climate change policy in the developing world.   
B. Payment for Ecosystem Services Projects as an
Indication of An Emerging Consensus That
Environmental Externalities Should Be Quantified
Payments for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) programs involve a voluntary 
transaction where landowners are compensated for providing some benefit 
to the ecosystem, or the “benefits stemming from natural systems which are 
necessary for humans to prosper.”34  PES programs involve individuals, 
corporations, the government, or nongovernmental organizations providing 
compensation to individual landowners for ecosystem services provided.35  
Under PES programs, landowners who are providing environmental 
services - such as forest conservation on their land - are fully compensated 
for the benefits they have conferred on others.  For example, a landowner 
who preserves his forested land is forgoing the profits that could be 
collected from the sale of lumber and the use of the deforested terrain. 
Meanwhile, the landowner is conferring the benefit of carbon sequestration 
on others.  PES programs provide a financial incentive to private landowners 
to continue to provide ecosystem services in lieu of maximizing their own 
wealth via the exploitation of their resource-rich land.  Among the twenty-
four specific ecosystem services identified by a 2005 U.N. Sponsored report, 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, three services are receiving the 
most funding worldwide: climate change mitigation, watershed services, and 
33. Draft decision -/CP.16 (Advance Unedited Version), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf. 
34. Steed, Brian C., Government Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from Costa
Rica, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs (Fall 2007), 
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/vol23_1/Steed.pdf.  See Sven 
Wunder Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts. Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR) Occasional Paper No. 42, 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-42.pdf.   
35. Steed, Supra note 34.
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biodiversity conservation.36  
Costa Rica’s National Fund for Forestry Finance (“FONAFIFO,” Spanish 
acronym) is often referred to as the most successful PES Initiative. 
Established twenty years ago, the program has been responsible for the 
reforestation and preservation of over one quarter of the landmass of Costa 
Rica.37  Thus far, the PES has recaptured 26 percent of the country’s land 
mass-to-forest cover, “benefited more than 7,000 small-to medium-scale 
private land owners for the environmental services their property provides 
for watershed protection, scenic beauty, biodiversity conservation, and 
carbon sequestration.”38  
Market-based preservation programs are equivalent to PES systems, 
but if incorporated as a formal mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol, would 
offer additional ecosystem benefits, including the mitigation of GHG 
emissions from avoided deforestation, avoided combustion of fossil fuels, 
avoided extraction of fossil fuels, and avoided colonization.  The basic 
principle remains the same: To account for the external value of 
environmental benefits conferred by offering financial incentives to 
landowners who are conferring the benefit at the local level.   
IV. Ecuador’s Yasuní Initiative as a Model for Market-Based
Preservation Projects.
The Yasuní Initiative (“Yasuní”) presents an innovative, holistic policy 
to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gasses.  The Yasuní addresses the 
critical issues of climate change by compensating the global south with the 
opportunity to reinvent their economy.  The Yasuní is inherently multi-
dimensional so far as it conserves biodiversity hotspots, or a region with a 
significant degree of biodiversity, while providing an incentive to restructure 
the energy supply and demand matrix.39  Further, the Yasuni Initiative 
creates new entrepreneurial opportunities within Ecuador.40  Unlike other 
forest carbon projects, the Yasuní’s principle purpose is to mitigate the 
burning of fossil fuels by precluding the extraction of the fossil fuels.  The 
avoided deforestation and colonization of the surrounding area are only 
36. Demand for Environmental Services, Paying Farmers for Environmental
Services: Demand For Environmental Services. United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Office Report, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a1200e/a1200e04.pdf. 
37. Pax Natura: Peace with Nature, News: Costa Rica, a Leader in Forest
Preservation, available at http://www.trunity.net/paxnatura/news/view/131452/?topic= 
8718 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
38. Pax Natura: Peace with Nature, Payment for Environmental Services: Program
Highlights, available at http://www.paxnatura.org/CostaRicanPESProgram.htm. 
39. See Yasuni Bonn Presentation August 2010, 3 (Aug. 28, 2010), available at
http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/3EYC0. 
40. Id.
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additional positive side effects of the initiative.  There are many additional 
benefits of Yasuni-type projects, including environmental protection and 
social justice, surplus carbon sinks, and the evolution of petro-dependent 
economies into green technology leaders.   
A. Fundamentals of the Yasuní Initiative.
It is estimated that 900 million barrels of crude oil, about 20 percent of 
Ecuador’s total reserves lie underneath the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini 
(“ITT”) oilfields within Yasuní National Park.41  In the Yasuní Initiative, 
Ecuador’s President Correa has offered to leave the ITT reserves unexploited 
in exchange for $600 million to $700 million annually for ten years, which is 
equivalent to the revenue Ecuador would expect from exploiting the oil.42  At 
a conference in Ecuador, the Earth Economics Institute estimated the total 
value of extracting the oil would have a present value of U.S.$5.026 billion.43  
The protection of the Yasuní from oil extraction would prevent the emission 
of 406.91 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from the burning of the fossil 
fuel alone, which is equivalent to the annual emissions of Brazil (332 million 
tons), France (373 million tons) and Ecuador’s emissions over thirteen years 
41. Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Proposal, University of Maryland College of Chemical &
Life Sciences, available at http://sef.umd.edu/sef2007.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
In a presentation given by Alberto Acosta, ex minister of energy and mines of 
Ecuador presented the Ecuadorian government’s working assumptions regarding the 
value of oil under ITT.  Acosta estimated that there are 900 million barrels of 
recoverable reserves based on 36 million barrels of average expected annual 
production.  See also Davis, Tracy, Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel: Ecuador’s Plan 
to Leave Its Oil in the Ground, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 243, 245, 30 Houjil 243 (Mar Session 
2008) [Hereinafter Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel]. 
42. Larrea, Carlos, Yasuni ITT: An Initiative to Change History, 4, available at
http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/initiative_change_history_sep.pdf.  
[hereinafter Larrea]  “In the European Market for Certificates of Emissions 
Reductions (CERs), the value of the avoided emissions prevented by the Initiative 
would be US$7.19 billion.”    
43. See also Summary of Yasuni ITT Conference, November 21-23, 2007, Universidad
Andina Simon Bolivar, available at http://www.eartheconomics.org/FileLibrary/file/ 
Reports/Summary_of_Yasun%C3%AD_ITT_Conference.pdf.   “The heavy crude from 
ITT would need to be deluded, therefore, the proposal is to mix the crude from ITT 
with that of block 15 stored in Lago Agrio and transport it to a new refinery which 
would be built in Manabi. They estimate 944 million barrels of crude oil and project 
its price by considering the market price for this type of crude between January 2006 
and March 2007 (between $22 and $49), they add $2 to production costs for 
externalities giving the costs per barrel a total of $18,5. The income per barrel is 
projected to be $32.1 leaving $13.6 per barrel in revenue for the State. The net 
present value of utilities from ITT with a 12% discount rate is estimated at $5,026 
billion.”  
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(twenty-nine million tons).44  
Ecuador has a petro-dependent economy, with half of its export 
earnings and one fourth of public sector revenues coming from its 
petroleum resources,45  the proposal by President Correa may signify that 
Ecuador’s desire to conserve the Yasuní outweighs the financial incentive to 
develop and extract the oil under its surface.  According to one Senior 
Associate of the environmental think tank the World Resources Institute 
(WRI), Ecuador is motivated by its belief that it can actually “be a green 
pioneer by showing the rest of the world how one can build an economy 
while protecting the environment.”46  Carlos Larrea, technical director of the 
Yasuní Initiative and a professor at the Andean University Simon Bolivar in 
Quito, explains the three main purposes of the Yasuní Initiative as 
“mitigating global warming, preserving biodiversity in one of the most 
important hot spots on the planet, and mitigating poverty by creating 
sustainable employment.”47  The Yasuní Initiative is, in the words of the 
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), “an opportunity for the 
world to consider more just and equitable paradigms of sustainable 
development.”48  Ecuador is the first country that has considered leaving 
lucrative oil reserves unexploited in order to mitigate the effects of climate 
change.49 
B. Contextualizing the Yasuní Initiative
In 2001, Agip Oil Ecuador BV, a subsidiary of the multibillion dollar 
Italian petrochemical company, “Eni,” convinced an association of Huaroani 
Indians to sign over oil access to tribal lands and give up their future right to 
sue for environmental damage.50  In return Agip gave modest allotments of 
medicine, food, a $3,500 schoolhouse, plates, cups, an Ecuadorian flag, two 
44. Climate Equity, Schalatek, Liane, Yasuní ITT: It’s Worth the Trust! (Sep. 30,
2010), available at http://climatequity.org/2010/09/30/yasuni-itt-its-worth-the-trust/.  See 
also supra not 6, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/misc04a01.pdf. 
45. The World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ec.html, “Ecuador” (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
46. Hearn, Kelly, Deep in Ecuador’s Rainforest, A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza (Sep.
13, 2010), available at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/deep_in_ecuadors_rainforest_a_ 
plan_to_forego_an_oil_bonanza/2315/. 
47. Id.
48. Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Program,
Ecuador Yasuní ITT Trust Fund, http://mdtf.undp.org/yasuni (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
(Hereinafter Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office). 
49. McAvoy, Esmé, The Worlds First Really Green oil deal (Aug. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/the-worlds-first-really-
green-oil-deal-2046512.html. 
50. Hearn, Kelly, Exclusive: Selling the Amazon for a Handful of Beads (Jan. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.alternet.org/story/30657/. 
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soccer balls and a referee’s whistle.51  Indicative of the vast gap  between 
cultures, two of the tribal representatives signed the document with 
fingerprints.52   
Historically, Ecuador’s desire to maximize investment in the country 
has outweighed its obligation to work in the best interest of its people.53  In 
July 2001, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense and sixteen oil companies 
signed an agreement that established the terms by which the Ecuadorian 
government would secure oil installations, and committed the Ecuadorian 
military to control arms, explosives and undocumented persons.54  In return, 
oil companies would provide food, fuel and medical attention to the 
Ecuadorian soldiers.55  While these contracts are technically legal in 
substance, many argue that to be legal under Ecuadorian law, the 
agreements should be publicized, and these agreements were not.56  A 
spokesperson for Chevron, an oil company that has been accused of 
engaging in secretive contractual schemes,57 stated that the classified nature 
of the agreement is necessary because “(t)his is a very dangerous region and 
we take very seriously . . . the safety and security of our employees and 
contractors.”58  Supporting his assertion are stories of oil opponents who 
invaded camps, “destroyed equipment, and blocked highways . . . [o]ne oil 
executive says he knows of 19 kidnappings of oil-industry workers in recent 
years.”59 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Until recently, many believed the Ecuadorian army has “become a
private security force for oil companies, one obligated to patrol vast swaths of jungle 
lands while engaging, and spying on, Ecuadorian citizens opposed to oil operations.”  
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Transparency Snapshot: Ecuador, Revenue Watch Institute, available at
http://www.revenuewatch.org/our-work/countries/ecuador/transparency-snapshot. 
“The Constitution of 1998 guaranteed freedom of information rights. The public’s 
right to information access was further bolstered by the Organic Law on 
Transparency and Access to Public Information (“LOTAIP”), adopted in May 2004. 
The LOTAIP has been the foundation for disclosure of information about the 
hydrocarbon sector, notably effecting the publication of production sharing contracts 
and service contracts by the national oil company.” 
57. Excerpt: Affidavit of the Secoya tribe given by Elias Piaguaie -Aguinda, et
al., v. Texaco Inc. - Case # 93-CV-7527, Chevron (CVX) in the Amazon – Oil Rights or 
Human Rights? Texaco’s Legacy, Chevron’s Responsibility, available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/ business-and-human-rights/extractives/chevron-
corp/page.do?id=1101670. 
58. Hearn, Kelly, Woe’s mount for oil firms in Ecuador, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Feb 9, 2006), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0209/p06s02-
woam.html/(page)/2. 
59. Id.
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Conversely, in recent years under newly elected leadership, the 
Ecuadorian government has begun to push back against global oil 
companies.  Ecuadorian indigenous tribes have begun to speak out about 
environmentally injurious practices of Chevron, which have affected their 
basic rights to clean water, food, health and home.60  In one suit against 
Chevron, 30,000 Cofan natives claim that Chevron intentionally dumped 
nineteen billion tons of toxic wastewater into their territory in violation of 
their rights to an adequate standard of living, water and sanitation under the 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.61  The 
Yasuní Initiative represents an emerging Ecuadorian consensus among civil 
society: “nunca mas,” or No More exploitation of the country by foreign oil 
companies.62  
C. Background on Yasuní Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini
Initiative
The Yasuní National Park, described by scientists as “one of the most 
bio-diverse places on earth,”63 is home to an estimated 9,800 indigenous 
people who live in voluntary isolation from the modern world, including 
members of the Huaroani, the Tagaeri, and the Taromenane tribes.64  The 
Yasuní receive national and international recognition, including designation 
as a national park by the government of Ecuador in 1979 and a Biosphere 
Reserve by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) in 1989.65  However, these titles have “neither led 
to a clear definition of rights or responsibilities, nor bound the Ecuadorian 
government - nor the international community - to preserving its integrity”66 
60. Supra note 57.
61. Id.  “A report published on behalf of the Plaintiff alleges that these actions
contaminated both the soil and the groundwater of the communities in the area and 
will continue to threaten the economic and cultural bases of Indigenous peoples’ 
survival.” 
62. Supra note 4.
63. Global Conservation Significance of Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park, Margot S. Bass
et. al., available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone. 
0008767. “a typical hectare of terra firme forest in Yasuní contains upwards of 655 tree 
species—more than are native to the continental United States and Canada 
combined.” See also “About the Yasuni”, Yasuní Green Gold, available at 
http://www.yasunigreengold.org/about-yasuni.php “it is thought to be a zone that did 
not freeze during the last ice-age, which began 2 million years ago and lasted up to 
10,000 years ago. As a result, it became an island of vegetation where flora and fauna 
took refuge, survived and eventually re-populated the Amazon.” 
64. Id.
65. Id. See also MAB Biosphere Reserves Directory, UNESCO, available at http://
www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/biores.asp?code=ECU+02&mode= all. 
66. Planning Development Futures in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The Expanding Oil Frontier
and the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, Rival, Laura, University of Oxford available at http:// 
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beyond promoting Yasuní as a symbol for a bio-diverse region, which is 
worthy of preservation.67  Despite these national and international 
designations, the Ecuadorian government continued to promote oil 
development in Yasuní until the section of the park was designated as a 
“Zona Intangible,” or an off limits zone, in 2007.68   
In 2008, Ecuador altered its Constitution and became the first country 
to grant rights to nature by banning oil extraction in protected areas, stating 
in Article 71:  
(n)atural communities and ecosystems possess the unalienable
right to exist, flourish and evolve within Ecuador.  Those rights
shall be self executing, and it shall be the duty and right of all
Ecuadorian governments, communities and individuals to
enforce those rights.69
In addition to the alterations made to its constitution, Ecuador 
incorporated the notion of “El Buen Vivir”70 (Sumak Kawsai in Quechua), 
which signifies “living in harmony with humans and nature.”71  While 
Ecuador has always perceived its economy to be based on mining and 
petroleum industries, this bold alteration of its Constitution is recognition 
that petroleum-based economic activities have not “been beneficial for the 
economy, since the external debt only increased and no additional 
investments” were made in the country.72   
In July 2010, Ecuador enacted a new law which increased state control 
over the oil sector.73  Previously, mining companies and the government 
shared the profits of production with additional taxes levied on companies 
www.sosyasuni.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=148&catid=
1&Itemid=34 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).   
67. Id.
68. Leaving the Oil under the Amazon: Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative (Oct. 26, 2009),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00587.x/
full#b18.  “The southern section of the park was finally placed off-limits to the oil
industry in 2007 with the delimitation of a Zona Intangible, an untouchable zone
designed to protect the core territory of the Tagaeri and Taromenane.”
69. Warners, Lavinia, The Yasuní ITT Initiative: An International Environmental Equity
Mechanism at 49, Masters Thesis, Social and Political Sciences on the Environment 
Rabdoub University (Jan. 2010) (hereinafter Equity Mechanism). 
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. BBC News, Latin America and Caribbean, Ecuador Increasing State Control Over
Oil Sector, (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
10772445; See also Ecuador Moving to Increase State Role in Oil Sector, Israel News (July 25, 
2010), available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3924507,00.html. 
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that earned very high profits.74  Under the new law, Ecuador owns 100 
percent of the oil, and oil companies will receive a flat “fee” for the service 
they provide in extracting the oil.75  After enacting  the law, oil companies 
were granted 120 days (until November 22, 2010) to renegotiate their 
contracts with the government; otherwise their lease would be taken over by 
the state oil company, Petroecuador.76  With knowledge of this new law and 
its effects on their future profitability, Petrobaras - a Brazilian oil company 
with a lease over the land in Yasuní77 - transferred the land back to 
Petroecuador.78 
However, neither the creation of the Zona Intangible in 2007, the 
constitutional amendment in 2008, nor the 2010 law, guarantee that oil 
drilling will not proceed in Yasuní; Due to the fact that “drilling in protected 
areas such as Yasuní National Park and the Zona Intangible may proceed if 
declared by Congress to be in the national interest and approved by the 
President.”79  While the existence of this loophole raises doubts about the 
sincerity of Ecuador’s commitment to the preservation of Yasuní, even 
skeptics admit that “(m)aking the protection of the park economically 
attractive by recovering a portion of the foregone oil revenue would increase 
the chances of protecting Yasuní in the long term.”80  However, as discussed 
below, if the Yasuní Initiative does not succeed in garnering financial 
support, the Yasuní ITT is susceptible to destruction.81 
74. Hintadupfing, Ecuador Signs Historic Deal to Leave Oil in the Soil (Aug. 5, 2010),
available at http://hintadupfing.blogspot.com/2010/08/ecuador-signs-historic-deal-to-
leave.html. 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Petrobras’s lease covered the land in Block 31, located within the Yasuní
National Park.  See Update 1: Petrobras to Return Amazon Oilfield to Ecuador (Sep. 20, 2008). 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2048690320080920?pageNumber=1&virtualBran
dChannel=0. 
78. Id.
79. Finer, Matt, Leaving the Oil Under the Amazon: Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative
(Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-
7429.2009.00587.x/full (hereinafter Finer)  “(T)he strategic importance of the ITT oil 
fields would likely be enough to invoke the national interest loophole required to 
drill in Yasuní.” 
80. Id.
81. See Stealth Research in the Amazon (May 27, 2010), available at
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/international/2010/05/27/ef.amazon.research.bk.b.c
nn?iref=allsearch.  “In the past forty years alone, the Amazon has lost 20% of its 
forested land.” In the documentary, Earth Frontiers collected research on endangered 
species, which live in the Yasuní region, confirming its status as one of the most 
biologically diverse regions in the world. See also Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel 
at 249.  “If Ecuador is unable to raise the needed capital from the international 
community, as some doubt that it will, the country has indicated it will develop the 
ITT oilfield.” 
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Petrobaras’s proposed extraction plan remains a viable alternative for 
the Ecuadorian government if they do not succeed in gaining enough 
financial support for the Initiative to justify abstaining from drilling.  Under 
Petrobaras’s proposed oil extraction plan, the company would make inroads 
into the Yasuní by constructing six drilling platforms, connected by a train 
access route.82  Additional adverse environmental impacts would likely 
accompany the extraction process, since workers from Petrobaras would 
ultimately settle in the area to be closer to the extraction site, and 
infrastructure to support their colonization would develop.83 
1. The Mechanics of the Yasuní Initiative
On August 3, 2010, the Yasuní ITT Trust Fund was established and was 
immediately ready to receive contributions.84  On that day, the Under-
Secretary-General of the United Nations Rebeca Grynspan and Foreign 
Minister of Ecuador Ricardo Patiño signed a historic agreement that 
launched the Yasuní ITT Trust Fund, which was a “hard-won prerequisite for 
collecting pledges to pay Ecuador for foregoing the revenues it would have 
received from opening Yasuní to oil drilling.”85  
On June 5, 2007, the Ecuadorian government had officially adopted a 
proposal in which it sought contributions from the international community 
to leave all oil in the ITT Zone in the ground in exchange for fifty percent of 
the projected oil revenue.86  Under this plan, contributions could be made 
directly to Ecuador, or in the form of debt for conservation swaps.87  Debt for 
conservation swaps allow individual non-governmental organizations or 
governments to purchase a nation’s foreign debt title, then exchange that 
82. See Finer.  See also Investor’s Brief: Proposed Petrobras Oil Development in Ecuador’s
Block 31 in Yasuní National Park, available at http://www.banktrack.org/download/ 
investors_brief/yasuniinvestorsbrieffinal.pdf.  See also Illustration 2 (Attached). 
83. Id.  “New access routes often trigger additional deforestation by
facilitating subsequent colonization that is very difficult to control, as demonstrated 
by the experience following construction of a new oil access road just to the west of 
the ITT fields.” 
84. See It’s Worth the Trust.  See also Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office.
85. Hearn, Kelly, Deep in Ecuador’s Rainforest, A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza (Sep.
13, 2010), available at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/deep_in_ecuadors_rainforest 
_a_plan_to_forego_an_oil_bonanza/2315/; See also Vogel, Joseph Henry, Opinion: 
Yasuní and the New Economics of Climate Change (Aug. 23, 2010), available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-23/opinion/oped.yasuni_1_climate-change-oil-fields-
intergovernmental-panel/2?_s=PM:OPINION. 
86. German Bundestag, 16th Electoral Term, 3 available at http://www.ute-
koczy.de/cms/default/dokbin/287/287012.for_the_scrutiny_and_development_of_ecu.
pdf.  The forms of payment considered by the Ecuadorian government include: debt 
relief, financial contributions from other countries, financial contributions from 
NGOs and other civil society groups and donations from individuals.   
87. Id.
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debt with the country for conservation program guarantees.88 
However, in mid-2008, Ecuador altered its proposal, instead offering 
CO2 credits for sale amounting to the total projected oil revenue if the oil 
were exploited.89  Ecuador has proposed the sale of Yasuní Guarantee 
Certificates (“CGYs”) as carbon credits to be purchased by governments or 
by companies, with the goal of making the credits fungible under the 
European Union Trading System.90  Although not recognized under the 
Kyoto Protocol, Ecuador is offering CGYs for sale based on the hope that the 
credits will be usable with the passage of a new climate change agreement 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.91   
Ecuador has pledged to use all investments for social projects, to 
develop alternative energies, to invest in conservation and environmental 
projects, and to develop ecotourism within Ecuador.92   
2. Insuring Financial Contributions
To insure all financial contributions, the Government of Ecuador plans 
to issue CGYs proportional to the value of avoided CO2 emissions from 
abstaining from burning the oil, according to the price of the European 
Allowances (“EUAs”) in the Leipzig Carbon Market.93  Ecuador proposes that 
governments should purchase CGYs now for use at future auctions of EU 
Emissions Allowances.94  Annex 1 Countries of the Kyoto Protocol that 
choose to support the Initiative will consider the CGYs equivalent to a 
carbon credit, and private companies will ultimately have the opportunity to 
purchase the CGYs to offset their carbon emissions from the countries that 
purchase such credits.95  Carbon credits are equivalent to one ton of carbon 
dioxide, and can be earned through the sequestration or reduction of CO2 
emissions.  Carbon offsetting involves the sale of carbon credits to offset an 
88. See WWF Center for Conservation Finance, Commerical Debt-for-Nature
Swaps (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/external/wwf/wwf-
commercial-swaps-en.pdf.   
89. Larrea at 4.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Larrea at 24.
94. Id.; See also Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office.  See also Leaving the Oil under the
Amazon: Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative (Oct. 26, 2009), available at  http://onlinelibrary. 
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00587.x/full#b18.   
95. Yasuni ITT Initiative, World Resources Institute Slide Show Presentation,
Slide 8/26, available at http://www.slideshare.net/WorldResources/yasuni-itt-initiative-
presentation. 
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individual’s or business’s own emissions.96 
The CGYs do not expire, do not accrue interest, and may only be 
redeemed in the event that the Ecuadorian government decides to begin oil 
exploration within the ITT Reserves, in which case the certificates will be 
returned at full face value.97  If contributions are too small to warrant the 
issuance of a CGY, the contribution will be considered a donation to the 
Yasuní Initiative.98  The CGY certificates ensure that “the crude [oil] stays, in 
an indefinite manner, below ground.”99  
The income generated by the sale of certificates will be put into the 
UNDP managed trust fund, and the interest accrued off the trust fund will 
support sustainable development projects within Ecuador.100  
3. Managing the Trust Fund
The trust fund is managed by the UNDP, and governed by a six-person 
steering committee, which will make all funding decisions regarding the 
initiative.101  Ecuadorian governmental officials will hold three seats on the 
steering committee, two seats will go to contributing countries, and the 
remaining seats will go to a representative from Ecuadorian civil society.102   
4. Funding the Account
Funding of the account has been divided into two stages: a capital 
fund window and a revenue fund window. Under the capital fund window, 
contributions will be invested in a select list of renewable energy projects 
including hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, and tidal plants. The 
value of carbon would be updated each year, using the present price of 
carbon credits.103  The expected 7 percent return on those investments will 
96. ECI (July 4, 2008). Carbon Offsets, available at http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/
research/climate/cop07/offsets.php, University of Oxford Environmental Change 
Institute (last visited March 2, 2011).  
97. Larrea at 39.
98. Id.  “Where the contribution is below the minimum threshold established
by the Steering Committee, it shall constitute a donation to the Yasuní ITT Trust 
Fund and will not entitle the Contributor to CGYs.”  
99. Hearn, Kelly, Deep in Ecuador’s Rainforest: A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza (Sep.
13, 2010), available at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/deep_in_ecuadors_rainforest_ 
a_plan_to_forego_an_oil_bonanza/2315/.  
100. Leaving the Oil under the Amazon: Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative (Oct. 26, 2009),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00587.x/full# 
b18.   
101. Ecuador Yasuní ITT Trust Fund: Terms of Reference (July 28, 2010), available at
http://climatequity.org/2010/09/30/Yasuní-itt-its-worth-the-trust/. 
102. Id.
103. Larrea at 21.
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be disbursed into a pot in the revenue fund window.104  Income generated in 
the revenue fund window will fund environmental and social development 
projects to be determined by the steering committee of the fund.105  Such 
development projects include reforestation, conservation, energy efficiency, 
agro-forest management, and social programs for indigenous groups.106   
V. Avoided Deforestation Projects As the Best Climate
Change Policy
A. Potential to Convert a Petro-Driven Economy into a
Green Leader
By reinvesting contributions directly into renewable energy projects in 
the developing world, market-based preservation projects afford developing 
nations the opportunity to transform themselves from being dependent on 
resource exploitation into green economies.  This assertion is best 
illustrated in the case of Ecuador, which has traditionally been a petro-
driven economy.  During the past few years, Ecuador has begun investing in 
new green technology by installing the first pilot wind-power plants and 
photovoltaic solar panels, and promoting the use of renewable energies 
such as biofuels and other alternative fuels.107  Ecuador’s green potential108 is 
vast, and includes high potential for geothermal energy due to high volcanic 
activity, opportunity for growth in the amount of energy produced from 
hydroelectric dams, high solar potential due to its location on the equator 
which produces a stable sunny climate, wind energy generation in the Andes 
and at the coast, and the possibility of generating tidal energy.109  However, 
to continue to grow its portfolio of renewable energy projects and break its 
cycle of petro-dependence, Ecuador - like other developing nations - will 
need foreign investment in its green economy.   
As an illustration of the potential of avoided deforestation programs to 
convert petro-dependent economies into green energy leaders, Guatemala 
and Nigeria have approached Ecuador for help in designing similar 
104. McAvoy, Esmé, The Worlds First Really Green Oil Deal (Aug. 8, 2010), available
at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/the-worlds-first-really-
green-oil-deal-2046512.html. 
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Carrion, Hugo, 2010 - ICTs and Environmental Sustainability, available at
http://www.giswatch.org/country-report/2010-icts-and-environmental-sustainability/ 
ecuador. 
108. This term refers to the potential of a country to convert from petro-
dependency to reliance on sustainable forms of energy. 
109. Supra note 34.
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programs, which may be implemented in their countries.110  Further, 
countries that share key characteristics with Ecuador may adopt this model - 
specifically, developing countries located in areas of high biodiversity, who 
similarly have abundant oil reserves.  Continued greenhouse gas emissions 
and the increasing intensification of climate change represent a significant 
expense for developing nations as they cope with extreme weather patterns 
from flooding to droughts.111  While cynics suggest that scarcity will 
ultimately provide a powerful incentive to drill as the value of oil continues 
to rise, if developing nations succeed in transforming themselves into 
economies that thrive off of their green markets, they may not be forced to 
succumb to pressures and drill in biologically and culturally sensitive zones.  
Encouraging the development of alternative solutions now, especially 
amongst developing countries, is a means of giving developing economies a 
head start at becoming green leaders, and therefore represents an 
investment in international development both in the short term and into the 
future.  
B. Represents a Holistic Political Shift, Leakage Will Be
Minimized
Leaders of indigenous groups worry that in setting aside one area of 
the country as off limits to deforestation and resource extraction will 
encourage exploitation of the other areas that would have otherwise been 
preserved.  Referred to as “leakage” in the climate change policy community, 
this problem stands as one of the principle arguments against allowing 
credits for market-based preservation  projects to be integrated into the 
flexibility mechanisms of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  However, if 
market-based preservation programs are integrated into the successor in the 
right way, or pitched as nothing less than a “new paradigm for 
development,”112 these programs will prove to be stepping stones for 
converting developing nations from a petro-economies to green leaders.   
Unlike reforestation projects, which require monitoring all forests 
within a nation to ensure that leakage has not caused the overall rate of 
deforestation to remain the same, market-based preservation programs such 
as the Yasuní Initiative are location specific.  So as long as the Yasuní is not 
drilled, the intended carbon sink will be maintained.  While reforestation 
projects are susceptible to concurrent deforestation, thereby diminishing 
110. Hintadupfing, supra note 73.
111. Larrea Supra note 20 at 10.
112. Daniel Ortega, a spokesperson for the environment and climate change
ministry in Ecuador stated, “We are seeking nothing less than a new paradigm for 
development. This is what the majority of people in Ecuador want.”  See Ferti, 
Duroyan, Ecuador to Leave Oil in Ground (Aug. 7, 2010), available at http:// 
www.greenleft.org.au/node/45045.  
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the efficacy of reforestation as creating a carbon sink, avoided resource 
extraction and preservation of bio-diverse regions in perpetuity is not an 
interchangeable commodity.  Further, since the money saved will be 
invested in renewable energy technologies, the incentive to invest energy 
and resources into the exploration of new fossil fuel zones will be 
diminished because of the increasing availability of alternative fuel. 
As an added bonus, while this project quantifies the carbon emissions, 
which are mitigated as a result of limiting the extraction of oil, a surplus of 
carbon emissions are additionally forestalled by avoiding deforestation, 
which would accompany the colonization of the surrounding areas to 
accommodate oil workers.   
C. Questions of Additionality113 are Resolved
The question of whether forests such as the Yasuní ITT forest would be 
preserved regardless of this initiative is clearly answered: no.  In the case of 
Ecuador, with proven significant reserves of oil under the surface of the 
Yasuní ITT, its destruction is imminent without the Yasuní ITT Initiative. 
Leaving the ITT reserves in place via the Yasuní Initiative is the only option 
being considered by the Ecuadorian government that does not involve 
“extraction and development of the oil.”114  As recently as January 9, 2010, 
Ecuador’s President Correa threatened donor countries, which he believed 
were threatening Ecuador’s sovereignty over the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, that 
he was willing to resort to his Plan B of awarding an oil drilling contract to 
Petrobaras and stated: “keep your money and in June we will begin to exploit 
the ITT.”115  Ecuador’s leadership can justify drilling in the Yasuní ITT as 
“within the national interest” if they fail to gain financial support for the 
Yasuní ITT Initiative.   
D. Avoided Deforestation Initiatives Such as the Yasuní
Represent a Bold Assertion of Environmental Justice
The average US citizen emits 19.73 tons of CO2 per year, while the average 
Ecuadorian emits 1.68 tons of CO2 annually.  Using the difference between 
these values and the global average per capita emissions rate of 4.18 tons of 
CO2, and assuming a US$10 perton CO2 cost of mitigation, the total US 
debt would be US$45.7 billion per year, while Ecuador could realize a credit 
113. “Additionality” refers to whether “the project (reduces) emissions in a way
that is business as usual, or is it beyond business as usual,” See http://www. 
nativeenergy.com/pages/additionality/38.php. 
114. Supra note 19, Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel at 249.
115. Andrade, Lisa, Ecuador: Controversy Over Drilling for Petroleum in the Amazon
(Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-ubelaker-andrade/ 
ecuador-controversy-over_b_478645.html. 
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of US$325 million per year.116 
The Yasuní Initiative represents a holistic approach that focuses on 
preserving the rights of the indigenous people who would otherwise be 
displaced, or unfairly negotiated out of title to their native land.  On October 
30 and 31, 2008, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador 
(“CONAIE”), which represents fourteen indigenous nationalities and 
eighteen indigenous communities in Ecuador, assembled a special meeting 
in Tena, Ecuador, in order to pass a resolution in support of the Yasuní 
Initiative.  The committee resolved “to support the international campaign 
Yasuní Green Gold . . . that forbids the oil exploitation in the ITT area.”117 
While it may be argued that the Yasuní Initiative boldly and wrongfully 
asserts the Ecuadorian government’s ownership over indigenous occupied 
territory, CONAIE’s support for the initiative represents the position of the 
indigenous people in realizing that the Yasuní Initiative is a viable and - 
more relevantly - a realistic mechanism for preserving the indigenous 
people’s ancestral land. 
VI. Next Steps: Making Avoided Deforestation Projects
Feasible By Allowing Them to Be Incorporated into
International Carbon Markets
On August 3, 2010, the Yasuní fund was opened for the receipt of 
contributions.118  In early August, Chile made the first country contribution 
of U.S.$100,000,119 which was largely a symbolic gesture aimed at 
encouraging and inspiring international support for the Yasuní Initiative. 
While Spain has announced its intention to analyze “mechanisms to 
contribute,” few other financial contributions have been committed. With 
116. Development in the Amazon Basin Countries: Alternatives to Extraction of Non-
Renewable Natural Resources 50 (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.american.edu/ 
sis/gep/upload/Jose-de-la-Bastida-SRP-GEP-April-2009.pdf (Citing Correa, Rafael and 
Lenin Moreno. Keeping ITT Oil Underground. Concept Document Government 
Initiative. Quito: Vicepresidencia de la República del Ecuador, n.d.).  
117. “The CONAIE supports Yasuni Green Gold” (Nov. 13, 2008), available at
http://yasunigreengold.blogspot.com/2008/11/conaie-confederation-of-
indigenous.html. 
118. SAA Ecuador Yasuní ITT Fund English, Multi Donor Trust Fund Office,
http://mdtf.undp.org/yasuni/. 
119. Chile the First Country to Contribute to the Yasuni-ITT Initiative (Sep. 17, 2010),
available at http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/september/chile-the-first-
country-to-contribute-to-the-yasuni-itt-initiative.en;jsessionid=axbWzt8vXD9.  In a
ceremony held at the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, Chile’s Foreign Minister of Affairs
handed President Correa the check for U.S.$100,000 and stated: “The commitment
and contribution of the Government of Chile to this fund, while it may not be a
significant sum in monetary terms, is what we can do in the light of the earthquake
that struck Chile a few months ago and of other needs of our population.”
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carbon caps requiring many industrialized nations to invest in tradable 
carbon credits, voluntary, charitable investments in climate change projects 
are unlikely.   
To qualify as tradable under the EU ETS the Yasuní Initiative must 
qualify under the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) under Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows developed countries to invest in 
sustainable development projects that reduce emissions in developing 
countries.  Under the CDM, all projects must result in “real, measurable, and 
long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change”120 and be 
“additional” in the sense that the emission reductions in question would not 
otherwise occur but for the project.  Second, the project must be an eligible 
activity and adhere to transparency requirements and specified formal 
procedures.  Governance of the CDM is by the Conference of Parties to the 
UNFCC and an Executive Board, which registers worldwide CDM projects 
and issues CERs, which are transferable and can be used for compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol.121  Each tradable unit on the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) is equal to one ton of CO2, or one 
European Union Allowance.122   
The EU ETS is the largest emission-trading scheme in the world, not 
only in terms of installations, but also with respect to real emissions 
considered.123  Under the EU ETS, one ton of carbon dioxide is represented 
by one European Union Allowance (“EUA”); which is tradable in spot 
markets such as BlueNext (Paris), Energy Exchange of Austria (“EXAA, 
Vienna”), Nord Pool (“Oslo”), European Energy Exchange (“EEX, Leipzig”), 
and Gestore Mercato Elettrico (“GME, Rome”).124   
In June 2009, Silvestrum VoF – a small consulting firm located in the 
Netherlands, which consults on the creation of carbon assets in land-use 
projects125 – was asked to assess the possibility that the Yasuní ITT Initiative 
could be associated with international carbon market within the EU ETS.126  
Carbon credits may be awarded to initiatives such as the Yasuní in one of 
two ways.  First, credits may be awarded for the nonexploitation (or in the 
120. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at Article 12 (5) (b) and (c).
121. Supra note 2.
122. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Emissions
Trading, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731. 
php. 
123. Mansanet Bataller, Maria and Pardo Tornero, Ángel, What You Should
Know to Trade in CO2 Markets, Energies, Vol. 1, pp. 120-153 (Mar. 1 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156973. 
124. Id.
125. Silvestrum, Services, available at http://www.silvestrum.com/services/.
126. Analysis of the Yasuni ITT Initiative, 9 (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.silvestrum.com/_userfiles/files/Market%20Study%20Silvestrum%20English
%2010%20June%202009%20version%201_2.pdf. 
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case of the Yasuní, the non-combustion) of natural resources that would 
otherwise be exploited.  Second, credits may be awarded for the value of the 
carbon sequestration that results from avoided deforestation.  In the 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the latter accreditation should be 
considered.  Exclusion from the European Trading System means that the 
Yasuní Initiative will be traded only in voluntary markets, where REDD 
credits currently account for approximately one third of all credits traded.127  
Among the disadvantages of relegating the trading of REDD credits to the 
voluntary market are that credits on the voluntary market trade at 
approximately 80 percent to 90 percent discount compared to European 
Allowances.128 
A. Credits for the Nonexploitation of Fossil Fuels
There are three fundamental problems with awarding credits for the 
non-exploitation of fossil fuels under the CDM: 
 The non-exploitation of the oil stock is only a side effect of the
preservation of the Yasuní, and its combustion would
represent an independent act outside the prevented activity
(extraction).129
 CDM calculates emissions reductions against a “baseline of
emissions” rather than a “baseline of stocks;” therefore
maintaining the pools of fossil fuels that fall outside the
CDM’s normal framework.130  Specifically, the clean
development mechanism calculates the allotment of carbon
credits based on historical emissions from a given business or
industry.  Since market -based preservation programs do not
save against a backdrop of prior emissions, but instead forgo
future emissions, the baseline calculation is skewed.
 The Yasuní Initiative may be considered a policy decision,
which would fall outside the “business as usual” emissions
baseline normally used to calculate emissions reductions
under the CDM.131
B. Credits for Avoided Deforestation
Alternatively, the CGY Certificates may qualify under the CDM as 
“avoided deforestation credits,” since the preservation of the Yasuní from 
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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clearing and extraction is the primary objective of the initiative.  As 
previously stated, under the CDM, aforestation and reforestation initiatives 
have been integrated, however REDD has yet to have been actually credited 
under the UNFCC.  Some scholars have suggested that the Yasuní ITT 
Initiative’s greatest hope for incorporation into the international carbon 
trading market (specifically, the EU ETS) lies in its ability to effectively join 
together with other similarly minded countries and lobby for the inclusion of 
REDD activities into the CDM.132  The Government of Guyana has proposed a 
similar initiative to the Yasuní ITT and has asked the international 
community to compensate Guyana for not cutting down its forest at pace 
with the “rational rate of deforestation.”133  Bolivia has proposed preserving 
the Madidi National Park by avoiding drilling, which would conserve 1.9 
million hectares, and similar to the Yasuní, would preserve thousands of 
plant and animal species native to the area.134  Finally, India - with a low rate 
of deforestation - has fought to include conservation as an eligible category 
into REDD negotiations.135  
VII. Conclusion
In recent years, Ecuador has amended its constitution to become one
of the more environmentally progressive Constitutions in the world, 
incorporating rights for nature and re-negotiation oil contractors to provide 
fixed fees for oil extraction.  Yet still, like in most similarly situated 
countries, even the most biologically diverse tracts of land are susceptible to 
destruction by mining, fossil fuel extraction, and colonization if necessity 
requires the exploitation of the land.  The catch-all loophole, which permits 
the extraction of fossil fuels even with a real risk of destroying native 
villages, and sacrificing immense biological diversity, is a prime example of 
why new mechanisms such as the Yasuní Initiative, which preserve 
biodiversity and guard against environmentally hazardous practices, are 
needed.   
By incorporating avoided deforestation projects into the flexibility 
mechanisms of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, developing nations 
132. “Some scholars” refers specifically to the opinion of the consultants from
Silvestrum (the company asked to assess the feasibility of trading Yasuni certificates 
in the EU ETS). See e.g., Analysis of the Yasuni ITT Initiative, 9 (June 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.silvestrum.com/_userfiles/files/Market%20Study%20Silvestrum%20English
%2010%20June%202009%20version%201_2. 
133. Office of the President, Republic of Guyana, Creating Incentives to Avoid
Deforestation (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.gina.gov.gy/booklet%20on% 
20avoided%20deforestationf.pdf.  
134. Chavez, Frank, Madidi National Park and the Curse of Petroleum, (Dec. 9, 2010),
available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53819. 
135. Id.
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would be afforded the opportunity to invigorate their economies by stopping 
the cycle of the unfair exploitation of natural resources, and in its place 
creating opportunity for entrepreneurs to participate in a new, sustainable 
green economy.  The Yasuní Initiative is the first proposal put forth by any 
nation which proposes to leave a forest untouched in perpetuity in exchange 
for investment in the greenhouse gas emissions avoided by abstaining from 
drilling.   
